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A contribution to memory studies, this 
work focuses on Poland’s Warmian-Masu-
rian voivodeship. Before the war, this ter-
ritory and the neighbouring Kaliningrad 
region of Russia comprised the German 
province of East Prussia. In this article, 
we strive to identify the essence, mecha-
nisms, key stages, and regional features of 
the politics of memory from 1945 to the 
present. To this end, we analyse the legal 
regulations, the authorities’ decisions, 
statistics, and the reports in the press. We 
consider such factors as the education 
sector, the museum industry, the monu-
mental symbolism, the oral and printed 
propaganda, holidays and rituals, the in-
stitutions of national memory, the adop-
tion of memory-related laws, and others. 
From the first post-war years, the regio-
nal authorities sought to make the Polo-
nocentric concept of the region’s history 
dominate the collective consciousness. 
This approach helped to use the post-war 
legacy impartially and effectively. Howe-
ver, the image of the past was distorted. 
This distortion was overcome at the turn 
of the 21st century to give rise to the con-
cept of open regionalism. An effective al-
ternative to nationalistic populism, open 
regionalism provides a favourable back-
ground for international cross-border 
cooperation. 
 
Keywords: politics of memory, War-
mian-Masurian voivodeship, Poland, his-
torical and cultural heritage, open regio-
nalism 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of ‘politics of memo-
ry’ gained currency in the literature 
quite recently, in the 1980s. However, 
it is often used to refer to earlier peri-
ods in the 20th century. There are di-
verse interpretations of this term [1]. 
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In this article, we understand politics of memory as the combination of 
the attitudes of the state and its affiliated institutions towards the past, 
and the embedding of certain interpretations of historical events in the 
collective consciousness in order to suit the political moment. 
Discussions on the use of history for political purposes often centre 
on the national historical narrative, whereas the regional aspects thereof 
receive much less attention. The focus on Warmia and Masuria (today, 
Poland’s Warmian-Masurian voivodeship) is explained by the fact that 
this territory provides us with an opportunity to compare Polish experi-
ence and Soviet practices [2; 3] of the reclamation of the former German 
province of East Prussia, which was divided between Poland and the 
USSR in 1945 at the Potsdam Conference. 
In this study, we aim at revealing the contents of politics of memory 
and its tools employed by Polish authorities of Warmia and Masuria after 
the war, as well as at analysing the integration processes in the region — 
home to both the indigenous population and the new settlers. We relied 
on the local authorities’ regulations and directives, official statistics, the 
publications in the press, and the recent works of Polish historians and 
political scientists [4—6]. 
Since the post-war history of Warmia and Masuria is not widely 
known, we will start our narrative with examining the origins of the local 
population. 
 
An ‘integration pot’? 
 
The former South of East Prussia was first referred to as the Masurian 
District. Later, in 1946, it was renamed the Olsztyn voivodeship. After a 
series of administrative reforms, a Warmian-Masurian voivodeship was 
established in 1999. Home to 1,434 thousand people (2018), it covers 
24.2 thousand sq km. The reforms restored the historical name to the ter-
ritory [7]. The Poles have governed the region since May 23, 1945, when 
the Soviet commandant of the city Colonel Aleksandr Shumsky handed 
over power to Poland’s Plenipotentiary Jakub Prawin. In December 1945, 
the Masurian voivodeship Rada Narodowa (National Council) was es-
tablished by appointing 100 council members. The first election to the 
local bodies took place only in 1954 [8, pp. 682—683, 700]. 
As the fighting was over, approximately 200—250 thousand German 
citizen out of a pre-war population of 936.5 were remaining in the dis-
tricts of East Prussia that were to be transferred to Poland. These num-
bers included both ethnic Germans and Polonophones. The decision of 
the Allied Control Council on the ‘repatriation’ of the German population 
to Germany enjoyed the firm support of the Poles. The Wiadomości Ma-
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zurskie newspaper wrote that ‘the piles of hatred and untruth that grew 
between the Poles and the Germans’ precluded not only the assimilation 
of the latter but even the two peoples living in one state [9, p. 4]. The dis-
abled and senile, the mothers with many children, and the orphans were 
the first to be expelled. With interruptions, the mass deportation contin-
ued from August 1946 through 1948. From the cessation of hostilities 
through 1950, approximately 112 thousand Germans left the Olsztyn 
voivodeship for Germany [10, p. 395—400, 412]. 
When it comes to integration processes in Warmia and Masuria, 
Polish historiography often refers to the concept of the ‘melting pot’ [11, 
s. 11—12]. Thus, it is important to analyse the composition of the re-
gion’s population and identify its largest groups. 
 
Table 1 
 
The population of the Olsztyn voivodeship in 1950, by origin [12, p. 329] 
 
Population 
category 
Auto 
chthonous 
Internal  
migrants 
Repatria-
tes from 
the USSR
Repatriates 
and  
reemigrants 
from  
the West 
Unknown 
origin Total 
Number 
(thousand 
people) 117.2 352.4 134.2 3.1 3.3 610.2 
Specific 
weight (%) 19.2 57.8 22.0 0.5 0.5 100 
 
Table 1 shows that the majority of new settlers (57.8 %) originated 
from the southern and central Polish voivodeships. The autochthonous 
population and the settlers from the USSR accounted for a similar pro-
portion — around 20 %, whereas the percentage of the repatriates from 
the West was insignificant. Let us consider each group to gain an idea of 
their social experience, life ambitions, and collective memory. This com-
parison will make it possible to evaluate the actions of the authorities, as 
well as the relevance of the theory of ‘melting pot’ to the situation in the 
region. 
Autochthons. This term was used to refer to the local Polonophone 
residents that were citizens of the Reich. However, it was not completely 
accurate, since there were many descendants of migrants among the East 
Prussian Poles. The actual autochthons of the region were the ancient 
Prussians who had been fully assimilated. 
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Whereas the Soviet authorities deported all the German citizens from 
the Kaliningrad region, regardless of their ethnic origins, their Polish 
counterparts distinguished between the Germans and the autochthonous 
Poles. The two major groups of the latter were the Warmians (the Polish 
residents of Warmia who practised Catholicism) and the Masurians (the 
Protestant residents of the Masurian Lake District). These former German 
subjects had to go through the verification procedure — their Polish de-
scent had to be confirmed by a ‘civic commission’. The applicants had to 
prove that they originated from a Polish family, spoke their native tongue 
and cherished the national traditions. They also had to sign a declaration 
of loyalty to the Polish state. The preservation of their identity was out of 
the question. Moreover, the Polish settlers perceived the autochthons as 
‘Schwabians’ and often discriminated against them. The verification was 
a lengthy process. In 1949, the Polish authorities granted forced citizen-
ship to those autochthons who refused either to leave for Germany or to 
take an oath to Poland. Overall, approximately 133 thousand Warmians 
and Masurians obtained a Polish citizenship in the course of verification 
[10, p. 396; 13, p. 488]. 
These groups of the former East Prussian residents found it hard to 
adapt to the new conditions. When the opportunity arose, they preferred 
to leave for the country that they still considered their homeland. In 
1956—1959, 3.9 thousand autochthons left the Olsztyn voivodeship for 
the GDR and 32.3 thousand for the FRG. In the next decade, another 
15,000 people managed to obtain exit permits. The repatriation gained 
momentum as Poland and the FRG concluded a family reunion agree-
ment on October 9, 1975. In 1976—1984, 36.2 thousand people left for 
the FRG in the framework of the reunion programme. Overall, 105 thou-
sand residents of Warmia and Masuria resettled in West Germany in 
1952—1984 [13, p. 488]. Today, the official Polish statistics largely ne-
glects these ethnic groups. In the 2011 census, only 1376 people identi-
fied themselves as Masurian. The number of Warmians is usually esti-
mated at 4—5 thousand people. Some experts write that these groups 
number 20 thousand people, i. e. not more than 1.5 % of the total popula-
tion of the Warmian-Masurian voivodeship [13, pp. 488—491; 14, 
pp. 91—92]. 
Internal migrants. This group comprised the settlers from the central 
and southern voivodeships of Poland. Either resettling of their own will 
or recruited to populate East Prussia, all of them were coming to the re-
gion seeking a better life. Among them were several thousand people 
from war-ruined Warsaw, most of whom were high-ranking officials. 
However, the majority of the new settlers came from the rural areas. Alt-
hough poor and ill-educated, they were active, mobile, enterprising, and 
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in the prime of the lives. Some of the new settlers would terrorize the lo-
cal population by committing plunder and robbery and dislodging the 
rightful owners from their flats and houses [15, p. 201]. 
The internal migrants included the Ukrainians who were forced out of 
the south-eastern voivodeships as part of Operation Vistula in 1947. The 
operation aimed at removing material support for the Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army (UIA) and the cells of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists 
(OUN) in Poland. Approximately 12 thousand Ukrainian and mixed 
Polish-Ukrainian families, numbering 55 thousand people, were deported 
to the Olsztyn voivodeship. They were to settle in the most war-torn dis-
tricts at the border of the USSR. Although the majority of these people 
was never engaged in any subversive activities, both the authorities and 
the settlers of the Polish origin treated them as second class-citizens [15, 
p. 192—193; 16].1 
Repatriates from the USSR. Another stream of settlers was coming to 
Warmia and Masuria from Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and the 
Vilno province, i. e. the parts of the Second Polish Republic that were 
incorporated in the USSR in 1939—1940 (the Poles called these areas 
Kresy). In 1950, the Olsztyn voivodeship became home to over 130 thou-
sand Kresy residents. Their repatriates continued over the next years, 
with most Kresy Poles (approximately 30 thousand people) arriving in 
1956—1960. Settling primarily in the cities, they accounted for 42 % of 
the Olsztyn population in 1950. Most of the repatriates from the USSR 
were psychologically damaged, having gone through arrests, imprison-
ment, and exile. They felt that they had been wronged and combined 
strong anti-Soviet attitudes with hostility towards the new political re-
gime. They settled close to each other, preferred isolation, and tried to 
preserve the traditions of their home areas [11, p. 17—18; 17, p. 614; 18, 
p. 138]. 
Most settlers from the West were the Poles who either had been de-
ported to Germany for forced labour (repatriates) or had left the country 
of their own free will (re-emigrants). This group was rather small in 
numbers (slightly over 3,000 people in 1950). However, their interna-
tional experience (most of them returned from Germany and France) 
made them the transmitters of the knowledge, norms, and traditions that 
they had obtained in these countries [19, p. 175]. 
There were significant differences among the four groups. The rela-
tionships among them were not free of tensions or even hostility. Some-
times, the tensions led to open conflicts. All this rendered the ultimate 
goal of uniting these diverse elements into a harmonious regional com-
munity and an integral part of the Polish nation even more difficult to at-
                                                     
1 In 1990, Poland’s Sejm condemned the deportation of the Ukrainians. 
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tain. The authorities were faced with the challenge of ensuring a fair dis-
tribution of land, dwellings, and other material values. They had to establish 
equality of rights among all the population groups and to provide access to 
social benefits, education, and culture. Alas, this was not easy to do. 
Since the majority of both the local residents and the new settlers had 
had traumatic experiences in the war, of pivotal importance for the state 
and its institutions was to mitigate the consequences of this trauma and 
launch massive propaganda and awareness campaigns. It is quite natural 
that the construction of the ‘correct’ collective memory lay at the heart of 
the authorities’ efforts. The collective memory was to unite people with 
different historical experiences. 
 
Regional politics of memory in the post-war years 
 
Firstly, it was necessary to develop an attitude to the East Prussian 
legacy. In the Soviet and Polish parts of East Prussia, the authorities’ ide-
ological attitudes rested on a common principle of denying the values of 
German culture, which was proclaimed ‘Nazi’ and ‘hostile to Slavs’. 
Both the Olsztyn voivodeship and the Kaliningrad region resounded with 
the calls to ‘expel the Prussian spirit’, to ‘erase any traces of Germanisa-
tion’, to ‘get rid of all the German things’, to change the old toponyms, 
and to establish the new national and ideational symbols [20, p. 4]. 
In a short time, almost all the monuments and memorials were either 
dismantled or ‘revamped’. For instance, a relief was taken off the monu-
ment to the German economist Franz Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch in Ol-
sztyn. Instead, a plaque was mounted, saying that now it was a monu-
ment to the fighters for the freedom of Warmia and Masuria. The famous 
Tannenberg Memorial in the environs of Olsztynek was dismantled and 
its magnificent granite blocks were repurposed for the district’s largest 
memorial — the Monument of the Gratitude for the Soviet Army Sol-
diers (it was opened in 1954 and renamed the Monument to the Libera-
tion of the Warmian-Masurian Land in the early 1990s) [21, pp. 395, 397, 
403, 409]. In those days, still restorable buildings and fortifications were 
often demolished so that their bricks could be used in construction. This 
happened in Dobre Miasto and Lidzbark Warmiński in the 1950s. Some 
of the local churches were lost for good [22, p. 292—294]. 
In practical terms, the Polish authorities were, for the most, part ready 
to embrace the new environment without prejudice. They showed toler-
ance to the pre-war architectural landmarks and tried to draw on the eco-
nomic practices used by the previous generations of local residents. The 
efforts of the Polish intelligentsia, especially its indigenous members, 
helped to save and restore the Teutonic Order’s castles, palaces, and pub-
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lic and religious buildings. They succeeded in convincing the authorities 
that, in essence, the legacy received by the Poles not only was a product 
of German culture but also borrowed from the cultures of the other ethnic 
groups living in East Prussia — primarily, the Polonophone Masurians 
and Warmians. Later, the historical and cultural heritage of East Prussia 
was interpreted as part of Poland’s national wealth (which was not al-
ways correct). This thesis was supported by the fact that the region was 
once a territory of the Kingdom of Poland or an area colonised by the 
Poles.2 
An interesting aspect is the attitude of the Polish authorities toward 
the movable cultural legacy. The employees of the voivodeship and 
powiat administrations collaborated with the civic activist from 1945 to 
save the museum items, books, and historical documents from local and 
provincial archives, including those from the collection of the famous 
Prussia Museum in Königsberg. The documents, books, and artefacts col-
lected across the voivodeship were brought to Olsztyn. In 1947—1951, 
over 800 settlements were surveyed and over 700 tons of documents re-
trieved. These efforts translated in the vast collections of the voivodeship 
library, museums, and the state archive in Olsztyn. Not only the items 
linked to the Polish national tradition but also those with German roots 
were saved from destruction [23, p. 467]. 
One of the major elements of politics of memory were museums and 
exhibitions. In the absence of television or opportunities to travel in Po-
land and abroad, the museum exhibits played a crucial role in the for-
mation of collective memory. Moreover, museum visits were often oblig-
atory. The Museum of Local History opened in March 1945, before the 
cessation of hostilities. It was housed in the Olsztyn Castle. In 1948, the 
Copernicus Museum opened in Frombork. Museums and travelling exhi-
bitions had to familiarise the new settlers with the ‘Polish traces’ in 
Warmia and Masuria — early printed books and manuscripts, famous 
people, the fights of the Poles against Germanisation, etc. After 1949, the 
recurring themes of exhibitions were the achievement of socialism in the 
USSR, the PRC, and other friendly countries [24]. 
In May 1945, a voivodeship information and propaganda department 
was established to coordinate the political and educational initiatives. At 
the time, the department employed 24 staff. Two years later, the number 
of employees reached 86. Alongside the socialistic propaganda, the insti-
tution focused on historical education. The task was twofold — to famil-
                                                     
2 Warmia (German: Ermland), as a part of so-called Royal Prussia, was a prov-
ince of Poland in the 15th—18th centuries. The historical area of Masuria (Ger-
man: Mazuren) was populated primarily by the Polish colonists, who converted 
to Protestantism and were strongly Germanised. 
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iarise the autochthons with the Polish national historical narrative and to 
acquaint the new settlers with the rich history of the Poles living in 
Warmia and Masuria. The local press regularly published essays on the 
history of the region. Public lectures were held, many towns and villages 
organised popular courses and folk high schools. Public administration 
officials, teachers, and culture specialists were obliged to study the histo-
ry of the region. Additional history classes were taught at the local 
schools [25, p. 63—64, 75—76; 26, p. 320]. 
Grand celebrations marked the anniversaries of the Polish triumph 
over the Teutonic Order in the Battle of Grunwald in 1410. In the times 
of the Polish People’s Republic (PPR), the remembrance of this battle 
was the cornerstone of politics of memory. It was used to legitimise the 
republic’s authorities. Moreover, Grunwald was a symbol of the ‘Slavic 
unity’, the brotherly alliance with the USSR. In the 1950s—1960s, a 
tourism and entertainment infrastructure was built around the Grunwald 
battlefield [27, pp. 287—288]. For Warmia and Masuria, the celebration 
was also a means to put the history of the region into the national context. 
The Weeks of the Recovered Territories, which were held nationwide 
from 1946, acquainted the whole country with the present and the past of 
the reclaimed lands. 
The central role in these educational efforts was played by the Masu-
rian Institute, which was established by the local intelligentsia. Engaged 
in both research and education, the Institute forged close links with the 
largest national universities. The Institute’s staff were prolific authors and 
were often recruited as experts by the local administration [5, p. 63—65]. 
 
Politics of memory in the Polish People’s Republic 
 
Despite the ostentatious rejection of the ‘German legacy’ in 1945—
1948, the Polish authorities pursued a consistent policy of re-Polonising 
Warmia and Masuria. The Polonophone autochthons provided a link be-
tween the East Prussian legacy and the hundreds of thousands of new 
Polish settlers. As the democratic opposition was crushed and Poland 
tread on the Soviet path of development in 1948, the situation on the Re-
covered Territories changed. The Communists were convinced that the 
Poles of East Prussia had been germanised to such a degree that their 
very presence was a potential threat to the Polish state. 
Urged by the national authorities, the Olsztyn voivodeship opted for 
unification and the abandonment of regional identity. The Masurian Insti-
tute was closed (it was reorganised into a ‘research facility’ of the West-
ern Institute in Poznan). The popular courses and periodicals focusing on 
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the local history stopped their operations. The members of the Polish 
movement in East Prussia were accused of breakaway and even separa-
tism. The focus of the politics of memory shifted from regionalistics to a 
national Polish narrative [28, p. 29—30]. However, these changes did not 
affect the architectural landmarks, which were considered national wealth 
and protected by the state. Major restoration and reconstruction efforts 
were launched in the 1950s. 
The Polonocentric model of memory, which was adopted in the late 
1940s, remained virtually unchanged throughout the history of the PPR 
[29, p. 164]. However, the model gradually evolved over the four de-
cades. As a rule, a change happened when the country was faced with 
another social crisis forcing the ruling Polish United Workers’ Party to 
adjust its ideological tenets. In 1956 and in the first years of the rule of 
Władysław Gomułka, regionalistics was reinstated. The local historians 
and culture professionals were exonerated from separatism. This process 
was supervised by the Pojezierze (Lake District) civic association, which 
had been established following the official repudiation of Stalinism. This 
organisation brought together hundreds of local history aficionados. In 
1962, the Wojciech Kętrzyński Research Centre was established in Ol-
sztyn to coordinate the professional efforts at studying the past of War-
mia and Masuria. The publication of the local history periodicals was re-
sumed [23, p. 468—469]. 
An important landmark in the politics of memory relating to the Re-
covered Territories was an event that took place in 1965. During the Sec-
ond Vatican Council, 34 Polish bishops, including Karol Józef Wojtyła 
(future Pope John Paul II) sent a message of reconciliation to the German 
bishops. This verbose document analysed the Polish-German relations 
within a wide historical context, examined their light and dark sides, and 
recognised the fact that millions of Germans fell victims to the post-war 
deportations. In inviting the Germans to the celebration of the 1000th an-
niversary of the Baptism of Poland (1966), the Polish bishops addressed 
their fellow believers with the words: ‘We forgive and ask for for-
giveness’ [30, pp. 179—186]. Signed by 41 bishops from the FRG and 
the GDR, the response to this message accepted the invitation and sup-
ported the idea of reconciliation. However, the German side avoided the 
recognition of the Order-Neise Line, which was a top priority on the 
Polish agenda. This exchange of messages was condemned by the Polish 
authorities who interpreted it as treason by the clergy. The message of the 
bishops met a mixed response in the West and North of Poland, from 
where the Germans were deported after the war. Thus, this document can 
hardly be considered the ‘cornerstone in the restoration of the Polish-
German dialogue’ [29, p. 324]. However, a quarter-century later, as the 
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communist regimes in Eastern Europe had collapsed and Poland sought 
accession to the EU and NATO, the message of the bishop came in useful 
in providing an ideational rationale for the ‘return to Europe’. 
In the 1970s, the tension eased in Europe and the countries started to 
forge new relations with the FRG. Against this background, the debates 
on the historical legacy of East Prussia (which was usually associated 
with the threat of West German revanchism) lost their urgency. After the 
vast majority of the autochthons had left for the FRG, the remaining resi-
dents of the territory, most of whom were new settlers, had little interest 
in the region’s cultural heritage and local traditions. Turning into abstract 
museum exhibits, the local culture was cherished only by the few mem-
bers of the Warmian and Masurian intelligentsia [31, p. 46]. 
 
Warmia and Masuria and the ‘historical wars’  
at the turn of the 21st century 
 
In the 1990s, the changes in the regional memory landscape were as-
sociated primarily with the dramatic social and political transformations 
and with the geopolitical rearrangement of Eastern Europe. The com-
munist regimes collapsed, the USSR disintegrated, Germany reunified, 
and Poland was preparing to accede to NATO and the EU. Similarly to 
the other post-communist countries, Poland adopted memorial laws and 
created a ramifying infrastructure to support its politics of memory. Es-
tablished in 1998, the Institute of National Remembrance has been a ma-
jor actor in Poland’s academic, social, and political life since the mid-
2000s. The ‘new revival of the politics of memory’ [32, с. 41—51]) in 
Eastern Europe owes to the growing nationalist trends and the use of ‘his-
torical arguments’ in propaganda. 
In Poland, politics of memory was widely used by president Lech 
Kaczyński and the conservative party Law and Justice. On September 17, 
2009, the President opened the Alley of the Victims of Katyn to mark the 
70th anniversary of the Polish Campaign of the Red Army [33, p. 453]. 
The unveiling of the monument was timed to coincide with the 18th Con-
gress of Polish Historians, which was held in Olsztyn. At the Congress, 
President Kaczyński made a long speech, which set the tenor of the mee-
ting. This case demonstrates that a major area of the Polish authorities’ 
politics of memory is a confrontation with Russia in the field of history. 
In recent years, Poland adopted the laws that extended the powers of the 
Institute of National Remembrance and sanctioned the demolition of the 
monuments of the communist era, including the memorials to Soviet sol-
diers (with the exception of the war graves) [34]. In the late 1980s, the 
region of Warmia and Masuria faced an identity crisis. The former sket-
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chy and tendentious interpretation of the territory’s past was criticised. 
These new trends, which were embraced by the Olsztyn intelligentsia cir-
cles, coincided with the socio-political and cultural transformations cau-
sed by the revolution of 1989. Moreover, the decentralisation of the so-
cial lead to the so-called ‘uprising of the provinces’, when the local com-
munity acquired a taste for independent actions, including local cultural 
initiatives [29, p. 165]. 
A major event was the establishment of the Borussia (the Latin of 
Prussia) cultural association in Olsztyn in 1991. The organisation was 
founded by the historian Robert Traba and the poet Kazimierz Brako-
niecki, who started a magazine of the same name. The association’s char-
ter stressed that Warmia and Masuria had always been a multinational 
and multicultural region. Its members affirmed their commitment to a 
comprehensive study of the territory’s past, of the political and national 
relations that had existed in the region, and of its cultural, artistic, and ci-
vilizational values. The goals of the association included the adoption of 
a critical and innovative approach to creating new knowledge, new cultu-
re, and new relations [35]. This meant both the abandonment of a unilate-
ral, Polonocentric interpretation of the history of East Prussia and open-
ness to all the ethnocultural groups that once lived on this territory. 
The advocates of the concept of Borussia believe that, today, the cen-
tral problem lies in the preservation of the identity of the local historical 
and cultural landscape amid globalisation rather than in overcoming the 
taboos in the history of East Prussia. Moreover, the ‘open regionalism’ 
approach is increasingly in conflict with the principles of politics of 
memory professed by the ruling conservative forces. Their conservative 
commitment to patriotic education and the strengthening of national iden-
tity may lead to a return to the old national-communistic interpretations 
of history [29, p. 166]. 
 
Conclusions 
 
During the reclamation of the Recovered Territories, which began in 
1945, Polish authorities had to develop a politics of memory that would 
prove the legitimacy of the new national borders, create the optimal con-
ditions for the integration of these territories into the Polish state, and fa-
cilitate the adaptation of the new settlers to the unfamiliar historical and 
cultural environment. Soviet authorities had to solve similar problems in 
the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR and the Klaipeda region of the 
Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, the politics of memory 
pursued in the two neighbouring states differed in terms of both form and 
content. 
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In Warmia and Masuria, the regional authorities found a solution in 
emphasising the Polish elements in East Prussian historical and cultural 
heritage and using the experience of the autochthonous population in the 
reclamation of the region. However, the hopes that the region would be-
come an ‘integration pot’ and a common home to Warmians, Masurians, 
and the new settlers never materialised. The absolute majority of the local 
residents of Polish origin left Warmia and Masuria, primarily, for the 
FRG. 
In the 21st century, the region of Warmia and Masuria became, on the 
one hand, a hub for research and cultural collaborations with the neigh-
bouring territories and, on the other, found itself involved in the new ‘his-
torical wars’ brought about by the rise of nationalistic populism in East-
ern Europe. All this had a negative effect on the tenor of relations in the 
Baltic region. Although producing benefits for the ruling elite (such as 
national consolidation, and the legitimation of the regime), the ‘war of 
the monuments’ and other confrontations in the field of history may have 
very negative consequences for international relations. Moreover, they 
encourage xenophobic attitudes and provoke and deepen international 
conflicts. 
This background gives rise to tensions and even conflicts between the 
capital and the region, whose local historical discourses rely on the re-
gional identity, the recognition of the local multicultural heritage, open-
ness, and the readiness to cooperate with the neighbours and the ‘big his-
torical narratives’, which gravitate towards national singularity and ex-
clusiveness. In seeking dialogue, open regionalism remains an effective 
alternative to aggressive nationalistic populism and encourages interna-
tional transboundary cooperation and international integration. 
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